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First, under the

Telephone Solicitation Act, DTC Group's contracts are "null and

void" because of DTC Group's failure to register as a telephone solicitor with the Idaho Attorney
General's office. Void contracts

as opposed to contracts that are merely voidable -- cannot

serve as the basis of a tortious interference claim as a matter of law.
Second, as DTC Group has conceded on appeal, no customer breached a contract with
DTC Group because the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act gives customers an unqualified right
to cancel their purchase within three days, "without any penalty or obligation whatsoever." I.C.
§ 48-1004. DTC Group's argument that it need not establish the breach of an underlying

contract has been expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court For either of these reasons, the
District Court erred in denying the ]NOV motion on DTC Group's claim for tortious interference
with contract.
The District Court similarly erred in denying DOT Compliance's JNOV motion on the
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In denying that motion,
the District Court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence that David Minert
and/or Jeff Minert reported DTC Group to the FBI with regard to a price-fixing proposal. On
appeal, DTC Group concedes that the District Court's conclusion was wrong because the call to
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argument contradicts \vell-established public policy encouraging citizens to participate in lmv
enforcement investigations. It also ignores the fact that the July 10th meeting occurred prior to
execution of the Settlement Agreement. In any event, neither the call to the FBI nor any
participation in the FBI investigation violates any express or imp! icd obligation in the Settlement
Agreement. Thus, it cannot serve as the basis of claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
Finally, the District Court's award of attorney

shou Id

reversed because DTC

Group did not prevail on any claim that arises out of a commercial transaction between the
parties.

II. ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Failed to Apply the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act
1.

The District Court Erred in Denying JNOV on the Claim for Tortious
Interference with Contract Because DTC Group's Contracts \Vere Void Ab
Initio, as a Matter of Law, for Failure to Register as a Telephone Solicitor

DTC Group claims that DOT Compliance tortiously interfered with its contracts by
informing DTC Group customers of their statutory cancellation rights and encouraging them to
cancel. R., 000236-237. That claim fails as a matter of law because DTC Group's contracts are
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with
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Under the clear language of the Idaho Telephone Solicitation
to

renders its contracts "null and void.

LC. §

17

DTC Group's failure

1007.

.
.
DTC Group does not dispute on appeal the fact that it failed to registered as a telephone
sol

with the Idaho Attorney General's Office.

Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Instead, it

echoes the District Court's erroneous conclusion that DOT Compliance lacks "standing" to
challenge DTC Group's contracts as void. In support of that argument, DTC Group relies upon
Barlow v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881 (1974). However, Barlow does not hold that a

defendant lacks standing to raise the fact that a contract at issue in an intentional interference
claim is void. To the contrary, Barlow holds that a void contract cannot be the subject of an
intentional interference claim as a matter of law.
Barlow did not involve a void contract. Instead, the defendant in Barlow sought

dismissal of an intentional interference with contract claim on grounds that the payment term in
the underlying contract was so "uncertain" that the contract was rendered "unenforceable." Id. at
893. OTC Group selectively quotes this Court's holding as follows:
Whether or not such alleged uncertainty of a term would have
rendered the contract unenforceable in an action brought by one of
the parties to the contract is irrelevant to the question of whether
the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of the tort of
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contracts may be the subject

claim, the Court clarified footnote omitted by DTC Group that

"[t]he rule is otherwise with regard to contracts void ab initio.

Id. at 893, footnote 2. This

Court just recently re-affirmed the rule of law that "a claim for tortious interference with a
contract is available when a contract is voidable or unenforceable but is not available when the
contract is void ab initio." Silicon lnt'l Ore, JLC v. Monsanto Co., 1
see also

Idaho 538,551 (2013);

Int'/, Inc. v. Battelle Energy Alliance, /LC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (D. Idaho

2010) (entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant because the non-compete
agreement with which it allegedly interfered violated the law and was, therefor, "void" and not
merely "voidable").
The District Court failed to apply this important distinction and did not analyze whether
DTC Group's contracts were "void" or merely "voidable." Instead, it held -- contrary to this
Court's repeated pronouncements that a "void" contract cannot serve as the basis of an
intentional interference claim as a matter of law -- that DOT Compliance lacked standing to raise
the fact that DTC Group's contracts are void. See Tr., 654:12-15.
Given the undisputed fact that DTC Group is not a registered telephone solicitor as
required by the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, its purported contracts with customers are
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contract.
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DOT Compliance also was not

with the ldaho Attorney

's Office for a period

of time. However, once informed of the registration requirement, DOT Compliance registered as
.

.

a telephone solicitor \vith the Idaho Attorney General's office as required by law. Tr., 574: 1217. OTC Group did not. 603: 17 - 605

When DTC Group finally got around to registering

just prior to trial, the Idaho Attorney General's Office rejected its registration application
because it did not have a clearly stated cancellation policy as required by the Idaho Telephone
Solicitation Act. Tr., 603: 17 - 605:22. ln any event, the only issue before this Court is whether
OTC Group's contracts are "void" or merely "voidable" as a result of its failure to register.
Given that the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act declares those contracts "null and void," the
District Court erred in denying DOT Compliance's JNOV motion.

2.

The District Court Erred in Denying DOT Compliance's Motion for Directed
Verdict on the Claim for Tortious Interference with Contract Because DTC
Group's Customers had a Statutory Right to Cancel within Three Days

"[A] prima facie case of the tort of interference with contract requires the plaintiff to
prove: (a) the existence of a contract; (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant;
(c) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract; [and] (d) injury to the plaintiff
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did not

this

customers to
has
(emphasis added). As a matter of law, however, the customers did not breach their contracts
when they terminated those contracts because the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act gives
customers an unqualified right to cancel their purchase within
or obligation whatsoever." LC. §

days, "without any penalty

1004.

DTC Group has conceded that, as a result of the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, no
breach of contract occurs when a customer cancels its contract:
Q ..... And so if a customer -- if any of these customers called you
within three days after they purchased and wanted to cancel, that
customer has not violated their -- or breached their contract with
you, right?
A. Correct.
Tr., 338:22 - 339:23; see also Respondent's Brief, p. 31 (acknowledging that, "[i]f a contract is
terminable at the will of a party to the contract and that party terminates the contract, that party
has not breached the contract but has only exercised their right to terminate.").
DTC Group did not present evidence to establish an essential element of its intentional
inference claim -- ''intentional interference causing a breach of the contract." Bliss Valley

Foods, 121 Idaho at 283-84. Accordingly, the District Court erred in denying DOT
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DTC Group did not bring a defamation claim against DOT

Compliance. It asserted a claim for breach of the non-disparagement

in the Settlement

Agreement, but the jury concluded that DTC Group failed to establish any damages related to
that claim. R., 000329-330.

Instruction
Over DOT Compliance's objection, the District Court issued a jury instruction that
misstated the elements of an intentional interference claim. Specifically, the District Court
removed from the standard lDJI 4.70 jury instruction the requirement that DOT Compliance
"intentionally interfered with the contract, causing a breach," and replaced it with an instruction
requiring only that intentional interference caused "termination" of the contract. R., 000318.
OTC Group argues that the modification to the jury instruction finds support in Wesco

Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881(2010). However, that case did not eliminate the
requirement that the defendant's intentional interference caused a breach of a contract. After
noting that "[l]iability may arise for tortious interference with a contract even where the contract
is terminable at will," the Court reiterated that the plaintiff still must establish "intentional
interference causing a breach of the contract" as an essential element of a tortious interference
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customers to
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found that because the employees didn't breach their employment
claims.

y
was no

Respondent's Brief, p. 31. That is exactly right; there can be no claim for
.

.

intentional interference without evidence showing that the "intentional interference caus[ ed] a
breach of the contract." Id. at 895
Oddly, OTC Group cites Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266
(1991) in further support of its position. That case explains exactly why the District Court's jury
instruction was erroneous. In Bliss Valley Foods, Robert Erkins ("Erkins") asserted that First
National Bank tortiously interfered with his contractual relationships by (l) interfering with his
consulting contract with Bliss Valley Foods and (2) interfering with his receipt of lease payments
from real property he had leased to Bliss Valley Foods. Id. at 283. Much like the District Court
here, the trial court in Bliss Valley Foods issued a jury instruction that omitted the third element
of a tortious interference claim as set forth in Barlow -- "intentional interference causing a

breach of the contract." Id. (emphasis in original).
Instead of mirroring the elements of a tortious interference claim as set forth in Barlow,
the trial court in Bliss Valley Foods issued a jury instruction replacing the third element of the
tort -- "intentional interference causing a breach of the contract"

with an instruction requiring
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was erroneous
contract
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to
to

Id.

in original).
Court then \Vent on to explain that liability for tortious
.

with contract
.

turns on whether the consulting contract was terminable without causing a breach. Specifically,
Court explained that, if the consulting contract was "terminable without

other having a

claim against it for breach of contract, then Erkins' claim based on the loss of those consulting
would not be the tort of interference with contract as set out in Barlow .... " Id. at 286.
''Only if Erkins had a contract with Bliss Valley which would subject Bliss Valley to damages
for breach of contract if it terminated the consulting contract with Erkins would Erkins have a
claim for tortious interference with a contract under Barlow." Id.
This Court held that the jury instruction issued in Bliss Valley Foods was erroneous and
constituted reversible error because it "omitted the requirement from Barlmv, in the tortious
interference with the contract claims, that the bank's conduct was an 'intentional interference

causing a breach of the contract"' Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court set aside
the jury's verdict.
The same analysis applies here. Just as in Bliss Valley Foods, the District Court's jury
instruction constitutes reversible error because it "omitted the requirement from Barlow, in the
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s

covenantofgoodfirith

by

Group to its customers in violation of the non-disparagement provision of the Settlement
Agreemen~. R., 000235. Consistent with the pleadings, the Distric_t Court's jury instruction
provided that jury could only issue a verdict against a defendant who "unfairly disparaged
plaintiff to others so as to nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract,"
causing damage to DTC Group. R., 000316 (Jury Instruction No. J 7). The jury returned a
verdict of $20,000 against both David Minert and Jeff Minert, individually, for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R, 000333-334. However, the jury did not issue
a verdict against DOT Compliance because of a lack of damages. Id.

"[T]he sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict must be based upon the jury
instructions.'' Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,275 (2013). "Whether
the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict will therefore depend upon the law as set forth
in the jury instructions." Id. The jury's verdict must be set aside because there is simply no
evidence in the record that David or Jeff Minert "unfairly disparaged plaintiff to others so as to
nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract" as required by Jury Instruction
No. 17.
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(2)

817

DTC

- 818:17.

call to the FBI occurred prior to execution of the Settlement
Court expressly excluded any damages (i.e., time, resources and attorney

and the District
that DTC Group

allegedly incurred addressing the FBI investigation and subsequent grand jury proceedings. Tr.,
467:22-25 (conceding that "[T]he report to the FBI took place well, before
meeting ... .''); Id. at 191 :4

July

10th

192: 14; 206: 19 214: 17 (excluding evidence of the "time and money

having to spend away from the company dealing with a grand jury investigation that in our mind
was frivolously alleged" because DTC Group had not disclosed such a claim for damages in its
Complaint or in discovery).
DTC group acknowledges on appeal that the call to the FBI cannot support the verdict
and now expressly disavows that theory. Respondent's Brief, p. 20 ("As a point of clarification,
DTC Group did not claim that [David or Jeff Minert] defamed DTC Group, or breached the
Settlement Agreement with DTC Group, when they reported DTC Group to the Department of
Justice on claims of criminal price fixing."). DTC Group similarly concedes that the District
Court was wrong in its statement that Jeff Minert disparaged DTC Group to a customer in a
recorded call. Id. at p. 27 ("DTC Group never asserted that Dave or Jeff Minert themselves
actually made customer calls.").
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now
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or Jeff

none

a verdict against David or Jeff Minert for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.

l.

Allegations of
Claim for

Bad Faith Do Not, as a Matter of Law, State a
of the Implied Covenant of Good
and .Fair Dealing

First, DTC Group argues that, although neither David nor Jeff Minert made disparaging
comments or otherwise breached the Settlement Agreement, they "entered the Settlement
Agreement in bad faith with no intention of ever complying with its terms after its execution."
Respondent's Brief, p. 20. That argument fails for several reasons. As an initial matter, there is
no evidence that David or Jeff Minert failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. DTC Group presented no such evidence at trial and they point to no such evidence
now.
Moreover, an assertion that a party entered into an agreement in bad faith does not, as a
matter of law, state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The implied covenant of good faith "only requires that the parties perform in good faith the
obligations imposed by their agreement." Silicon Int'! Ore, 155 Idaho at 552. "Thus, before a
party can breach this covenant there must be a contract." Id. As one court recently explained:
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formation and arose independent of the
initial
misrepresentations, we conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged
insufficient facts upon which to base a claim for breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cc1s. Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 638-39 (2002); see also 27
lliston on Contracts§ 70:48 (4th ed.) ("The general duty

faith and

dealing

extends only to the performance and enforcement of a contract and does not apply to the
negotiation stage prior to the formation of the contract. Therefore, a failure to act in good faith
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing during precontractual negotiations
does not amount to a breach.").

2.

DTC Group's Call to the FBI and Subsequent Meeting with Crossett
Occurred Prior to Execution of the Settlement Agreement, and the District
Court Excluded Damages Related to the FBI Investigation

Next, even though it has now disavowed a claim arising out of the FBI report, DTC
Group claims now for the first time on appeal that David and Jeff Minert breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they "wrongfully attempted to 'implicate' Mr.
Crossett for criminal price fixing." Respondent's Brief, p. 22. It appears that OTC group is
trying to draw a distinction between the original "report" to the FBI -- which occurred a few
weeks prior to execution of the settlement agreement -- and the subsequent July 10th meeting
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on

to

thus cannot
covenant

fair dealing.

(explaining that the video
to

to
original "report" or the later meeting "implicating" Crossett -- were excluded by the District
Court. Id. at 191

- 192: 14; 206: 19 - 21

17 (excluding evidence of the "time and money

.
.
having to spend away from the company dealing with a grand jury investigation" because DTC

Group had not disclosed such a claim for

in its Complaint or in discovery). Thus, the

jury's verdict cannot be supported either by the FBI report or any alleged attempt to "implicate"
Crossett in the price-fixing scheme. Even now, OTC Group docs not identify any damages
associated with its claim that the Minerts "implicated" it in a price-fixing scheme.
Finally, even if the July 10th meeting had not occurred prior to execution of the
settlement agreement, and even if the District Court had not excluded damages related to the FBI
investigation, it still could not serve as the basis of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The Settlement Agreement does not address, much less prohibit, the
Minerts from participating in an FBI investigation. Any such inference would fly in the

of

sound "public policy intended to encourage private citizens and victims not only to report crime,
but also to assist law enforcement with investigating and apprehending individuals who engage
in criminal activity." Kelley v. Tcmoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 601 (Ind. 2007). Allowing the verdict
to stand based on the call to the FBI or any participation in the investigation would have a
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and

Group asserts that

jury's verdict is supported by an inference that "Dave and

Jeff Minert continued to instruct DOT

staff to

DTC group and/or take DTC

Group's customers." Respondent's Brief, p. 24. As an initial matter, the jury's verdict for
of the implied covenant of

faith and fair dealing cannot be based on allegations of

DOT Compliance "tak[ing] DTC Group's customers" because that was the basis of DTC
Group's claim for tortious interference with contract

for which it was awarded $20,000 in

damages. R., 000236-237 (Amended Complaint, ~l(j[ 41-46). Otherwise, DTC Group would
receive a double recovery. See e.g, R., 317 (Jury Instruction No. 18, instructing that jury that
damages awarded for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "must be
distinct from any damages awarded for breach of contract.'').
Moreover, taking customers from DTC Group cannot constitute a violation of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the Settlement Agreement does not prohibit DOT
Compliance from competing for customers. See Van v. PortneufMed. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562
(2009) (the implied covenant "only arises in connection with the terms agreed to by the parties,
and does not create new duties that are not inherent in the [contract]").
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, an inch vidual

until
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about

Id. at 387:7-16.

is simply no evidence in

the record that David of Jeff Minert instructed employees to disparage OTC Group or otherwise
breached the Settlement Agreement.

Other DOT Compliance Employees
On a related theory, DTC Group argues that David and Jeff Minert, as principals of DTC
Group, are individually liable for any disparaging comments made by DTC Group employees in
violation of the Settlement Agreement. See Respondent's Brief, p. 29 (citing Jury Instruction
No. 23 for the proposition that, "As principles of and for DOT Compliance, Dave and Jeff
Minert are liable for their own actions and the actions of their agents.").
As an initial matter, DTC Group has misstated the law of agency. As set forth in Jury
Instruction No. 23, an employer company (the principal) is liable for the actions of its employees
(agents). R., 000322. However, that rule of agency does not make the individual owners of a
limited liability company individually liable for the actions of the entity's employees. David and
Jeff Minert are members of DOT Compliance, which is an Idaho Limited Liability Company.
R., 000229 (Amended Complaint, <ii 2). Absent a piercing of the corporate veil (which was never
alleged, much less factually supported), limited liability company members are not individually
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a
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or
or

employees, David and Jeff

cannot as a matter of law.

Perhaps more importantly, the jury expressly rejected DTC

s claim

liability

based on allegations of disparagement on the part of other DOT Compliance employees. DTC
group asserted a clairn for
DOT Compliance separate

of the irnplied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against
its claims against David and Jeff

That claim was based

on the allegations that DOT Compliance employees disparaged DTC Group in violation of the
Settlement Agreement. R., 000235 (Amended Complaint,~[ 30-34). The jury expressly found
that DTC Group suffered no damages as a result of DOT Compliance's alleged breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R., 000333-334. Thus, the verdict against
David and Jeff Minert cannot be supported by allegations that other DOT Compliance
employee's violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by disparaging DTC Group in
breach of the Settlement Agreement.

5.

The District Court Declined to Issue a Spoliation Instruction

Finally, DTC Group argues that David and Jeff Minert should be held liable for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failing to produce recordings of customer
calls. This issue is a red herring. DTC Group asked the District Court to issue a spoliation
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s

customer

19.
at 70 I: 15 -

cannot nmv

is not
and Jeff Minert.
finding that David

the question on

is whether any

to

supports a

Jeff Minert "unfairly disparaged plaintiff to others so as to nullify or

impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract." The call recordings referenced by DTC
Group are not of David or Jeff Minert. See Id. at p. 27 ("DTC Group never asserted that Dave or
Jeff

themselves actually made customer calls.
In summary, there is no evidence in the

David or Jeff

"unfairly

disparaged plaintiff to others so as to nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the
contract," as required by the applicable jury instruction. Accordingly, the District Court erred in
denying DOT Compliance's JNOV motion with regard to the jury's verdict against David and
Jeff Minert for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

C.

In the Alternative, the District Court Erred in Excluding the FBI Recording
The District Court abused its discretion when it precluded DOT Compliance from playing

for the jury a video of the July 10, 2014 meeting during which Crossett outlined his price-fixing
scheme on grounds that it was "impeachment on a collateral issue." Id. at 471:23-25. DTC

The Spoliation motion does not appear to be in the Record on Appeal.
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1

statement to

proposed the price-fixing scheme and then

a frivolous report to the FBI that Crossett

.

.

proposed an illegal price-fixing scheme. Id. at 186:24 - 189:9; Id. at 359: I0-21. In its closing
argument, DTC Group specifically asked the

to consider the time DTC Group had to spend

"to respond to the FBI investigation" when considering its damages award, even though the
Court had excluded all alleged damages related to the FBI investigation

they were not

disclosed prior to trial. Id. at 739:19 - 740:5.
The parties gave two completely different accounts of the July I 0th meeting and the
events leading up to it.2 Crossett testified that the Minerts proposed a price-fixing scheme,
frivolously and falsely reported to the FBI that Crossett proposed the price-fixing scheme and

2

DTC Group takes issue with DOT Compliance's characterization of Crossett's trial
testimony as "insist[ing] that he did not propose any price fixing." Respondent's Brief, p. 34.
DTC Group asserts that "upon review of Mr. Crossett's testimony he made no such
allegation." Id. Yet, that is exactly what Crossett stated in his trial testimony in response to
questioning from its counsel:
Q: Were you price fixing?
A: Absolutely not.
Tr., 359:20-21.
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consider those damages when calculating its damages award:
Let's talk ahout damages for a minute ....
. . . . And, remember, although -- remember I told you· about there
was these non-monetary or damages that David couldn't really
quantify.
things like ... administrative time, time to respond
to the FBI investigation, things of that nature that we're not going
to be able to recoup because we lost that third bucket. But just
keep in mind that those damages were there for David.

Id. at 739: 19 - 740:5.
The jury did exactly what DTC Group asked it to do and awarded damages based on the
FBI investigation. Indeed, the District Court denied DOT Compliance's JNOV motion on the
specific grounds that the jury's verdict against David and Jeff Minerts for violation of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was based on the call to the FBI. Id. at 817 :9 - 818: 17
("And I think in this case the jury could infer that the Minerts and thereafter their company were
responsible for the calls to the Department of Finance, the calls to the FBI ... and that was the
basis for their finding of liability.").
OTC Group is taking two completely inconsistent positions on this issue. On one hand,
DTC Group argues that the July 10th meeting is "collateral" and "irrelevant" to any issue in this
case. See Respondent's Brief, p. 34. On the other hand, although dropping its reliance on the
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covenant of

District Court erred by

it. If the July l 0th meeting is an "immaterial

-- i.e., because it was wholly unrelated to the Settlement Agreement and

lateral
before

execution of the Settlement Agreement, or because DTC Group did not disclose it as a basis for a
damages claim

then it cannot support the jury' verdict. Either ,vay, the jury's verdict must be

set aside.

Jury's

Must Be Set

for

In addition to the reasons set forth above, and as explained in DOT Compliance's
opening brief, the $20,000 verdicts against David and Jeff Minert for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be set aside for lack of damages. "fW]here a
plaintiff presents no evidence to support a jury's damage award, the court must grant a JNOV
motion in favor of the defendant." Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, 537 (2011 ).
The District Court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by the fact that David
and/or Jeff Minert reported OTC Group to the FBI. Id. at 817:9 - 818: 17. However, OTC Group
did not establish any damages caused by the FBI Investigation, much less damages in the amount
of $20,000. OTC Group attempted to testify as to the "damages" it suffered as a result of the
FBI investigation, including the time, resources and attorney fees it spent in connection with the
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If this Court sets

jury's verdicts for any of the reasons discussed

it must

also vacate the District Court's attorney fee award because DTC Group will no longer be the
prevailing party. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Simler, 158 Idaho 799,817 (201

("Given the reversal

of the district court's decision, Shuler and Eikova are no longer the prevailing parties in this case.
Thus, the award of attorney

is vacated.").

Even if this Court does not set aside the jury's verdicts, the attorney fee avvard must still
be reversed. Although DTC Group prevailed on two of its several claims, neither of those claims
permit an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ).
1.

DTC Group Did Not Prevail on its Breach of Contract Claim

The Settlement Agreement provides for an award of attorney fees to the "prevailing
party" in an "action brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement, including but not
limited to actions for breach of Sections 4 and 5 of this Agreement." Trial Exh. 500. DTC
Group asserted a breach of contract claim against DOT Compliance, David Minert and Jeff
Minert. Specifically, DTC Group alleged that those defendants breached Section 4 of the
Settlement Agreement (the non-disparagement provision) by disparaging DTC Group to its
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not
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contract are: (a) the
and (d)

of the contract, (b) the breach

(c) the breach caused

damages.").

amount of

.
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DTC Group cites no authority for its argument that it is the prevailing party on the breach
of contract claim even though it proved no damages. In fact, that argument

been rejected by

the United States Supreme Court. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) ("When a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of
his claim for monetary relief [citation omitted], the only reasonable

is usually no fee at all.");

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) ("Respect for ordinary language requires that a

plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.").
2.

The Tortious Interference with Contract Claim did Not Arise out of a
Commercial Transaction

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the party that prevails
on claims arising out of a commercial transaction between the parties. "Idaho Code section 12120(3) applies when 'the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit."' Sims
v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907, 911-12 (2015). "When a lawsuit has multiple claims,

courts look at each individual claim to determine what statutory basis allows attorney fees
recovery on that claim." Id. "In other words, courts analyze the gravamen claim by claim." Id.
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Group cites Blimka v.

Web

143 Idaho 723 (2007), for the proposition that a claim sounding in tort can
.

.

result in an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) if the claim arises out of a
commercial transaction. OTC Group then argues that its tortious interference claim arose out of
a commercial transaction because "OTC Group sued Appellants for 'transacting' \vith its
customers and interfering with contracts with its customers; DOT entered transactions with DTC
Group contracted customers for a commercial purpose." Respondent's Brief, p. 38.
While it is true that tort claims arising out of a commercial transaction may trigger
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ), that is only the case if the tort claims arise out of a
contract between the parties, not a contract with some third party. Printcrqft Press, Inc. v.

Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 461 (2012) ('Thus, even though fees are available
in cases involving a tort claim, a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit
must form the basis of the claim.") (emphasis in original).
Here, the tortious interference claim in OTC Group's Amended Complaint makes no
reference to the Settlement Agreement or any other commercial transaction between the parties.
R., 000236-37. Instead, it alleges that DOT Compliance interfered with commercial transactions
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transactions vvere involved. This Court
tortious

claim did not

that award of attorney

from a commercial transaction hetween the parties."

Id.

A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would usually
out of a commercial transaction, Le., the contract hetween the parties. Here, however, the
verdict for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not based on any
obligation imposed by the Settlement Agreement or any other commercial transaction between
the parties. Instead, as the District Court acknowledged, the verdict was based on the call to the
FBI -- an act that is not governed by the Settlement Agreement and, in fact, occurred prior to
execution of the Settlement Agreement. Tr., 817 :9 - 818: 17. Indeed, DTC Group has conceded
that the call to the FBI did not violate the Settlement Agreement. See Respondent's Brief, p. 20
("As a point of clarification, OTC Group did not claim that [David or Jeff Minert] defamed OTC
Group, or breached the Settlement Agreement with OTC Group, when they reported DTC Group
to the Department of Justice on claims of criminal price fixing.").
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As set forth above, neither claim on which DTC Group prevailed arose out of a
commercial transaction between the parties. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees must be
vacated.
Even if the Court determines that one or both of the claims on which OTC Group
prevailed arose out of a commercial transaction, this case should still be remanded to the District
Court to determine an appropriate award of attorney fees based on an apportionment analysis.
"When a lawsuit has multiple claims," a trial court is required to "look at each individual claim
to determine what statutory basis allows attorney fees recovery on that claim" and then
"bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant to § 12-120(3) only on the commercial
transaction." Sims, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d at 911-12.
The District Court did not go through that analysis. Instead, it stated in an oral ruling
from the bench, without any analysis of the individual claims, that "I don't believe this is an
appropriate case for apportioning the fees," and awarded DTC Group the entirety of its attorney
fees even though DTC Group did not prevail on the vast majority of its claims. Tr., 824: 10-12.
The attorney fee award must be set aside and remanded for a recalculation of attorney fees based
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Appellants pursuant to Idaho
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on appeal to

I 20(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

HI. C()NCLUSION
For the reasons set forth

the jury's verdicts for tortious

with contract

and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be set aside and the
District Court's award of attorney fees vacated. Upon setting aside the jury's verdicts, the Court
should mvard Appellants their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

~

1 120(3) and

Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and remand to the District Court to determine an appropriate
award of costs and attorney fees to Appellants as prevailing parties.

DATED THIS 2nd day of March, 2016.
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